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1 Introduction
The estimation of monetary policy rules suggests that the interest rates set by the
central banks (CBs) move with a certain inertia. In most empirical works aiming
at estimating monetary policy reaction functions, the estimated coefficient (usually
indicated with ρ) of a lagged interest rate term has been found to be fairly large
(close to 1) and highly significant.
A few hypotheses, ranging from the theoretical to the empirical realms, have been
suggested to explain this result. Some authors argue that it reflects the choice of opti-
mising CBs that purposefully aim at smoothing the interest rate path. Other authors
claim instead that the high estimated ρ’s are the artifact of improper estimations.
Thus, the debate on the ultimate origin of the estimated autoregressive term remains
lively, thereby delineating this issue as a modern ”puzzle” in monetary economics.
The rationales for a gradual movement of the interest rate over time could be
several and complementary: i) some interest rate smoothing allows discretionary
monetary policy equilibrium to approximate the superior commitment equilibrium1;
ii) CBs prefer moving the policy rates with caution because they are uncertain about
the correct model of the economy and are not endowed with accurately measured eco-
nomic indicators2; iii) monetary authorities dislike the volatility induced into financial
markets by frequent and large movements in the interest rates3; and iv) CBs dislike
frequent reversions of interest rates since these hamper their reputation-building pro-
cesses and communication strategies.4
All these rationales, which enter into the so-called conventional wisdom on inter-
est rate inertia, are challenged by those who maintain that the estimated interest rate
inertia is in fact the product of mis-specified monetary policy reaction functions. The
estimated inertia, they claim, is an empirical illusion and implies no policy gradual-
ism at all. Rudebusch (2002 and 2006) argues that the deviations of actual interest
rates from those predicted by a Taylor rule (without any auto-regressive compo-
1See Woodford (1999) and (2003) and Amato and Laubach (1999).
2See for instance Orphanides (1998), Sack and Wieland (2000), and Aoki (2003).
3See for example Goodfriend (1987) and Levin et al (1999).
4See Caplin and Leahy (1997) and Goodhart (1999).
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nent) “represent persistent influences on CB behaviour that are not captured in a
simple Taylor-type rule”(2006 p. 90). This view is also supported by Consolo and
Favero (2009). These authors relate the weak instruments problem to the correct
identification of the degree of monetary policy inertia; by addressing the weak in-
struments problem, the authors show that the estimated degree of policy inertia is
significantly lower than what usually found in the empirical literature on monetary
policy rules. Similarly, Lansing (2002) and Carare and Tchaidze (2005) show that
the inclusion of ill-measured determinants in the estimated rule (due for instance to
measurement errors and the incorrect choice of indices and time horizons), as well
as the mis-specification of the rule, may lead to a high estimated coefficient for the
lagged interest rate term even when there is actually no inertia in the policy-making
process.
These criticisms cast a doubt on interpreting the high estimates of ρ as signals
of intentional policy smoothing on the part of the CBs. However, neither theoret-
ical nor empirical studies have so far been able to provide a definitive account of
the issue.5 Against this background, Corrado and Holly (2004) maintain that the
observed interest rate inertia may in fact be due to the macroeconomic inertia in
the economy. Rudebusch (2002), Castelnuovo (2006) and Driffill and Rotondi (2007)
investigate how different characteristics of the private sector can generate optimal
monetary inertia by means of empirical, reduced-form New Keynesian models and
conclude that the aggregate demand plays a crucial role. The adoption of empirical
models, however, has two shortcomings. First, it prevents from referring any find-
ings to the deep parameters characterising agents’ behaviour. Second, it abstracts
from the constraints on the reduced-form coefficients that stem from the structural
relations of the theoretical New Keynesian framework.
In this work we make a step forward by distinguishing the relative importance of
5So¨derstro¨m et al (2005), for instance, show that Rudebusch’s interpretation (i.e. smoothing is
the by-product of serially correlated shocks) is inconsistent with the high predictability of the output
gap found in actual data. As argued by Castelnuovo (2003), Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Alcidi et
al (2009), it is most likely that both intentional policy inertia and some mis-specification problems
contribute to determine the high estimated values of ρ.
3
the agents’ preferences, while keeping into account the restrictions imposed by the
structure of the theoretical model. Adopting a theoretical New Keynesian frame-
work, we investigate the relationship between the deep parameters characterising the
preferences of the household and the degree of optimal monetary policy inertia, mea-
sured by the variability of the interest rate changes6. We find that the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and the household’s persistence in consumption
(HPC) considerably affect optimal interest rate inertia via their impact on the effi-
ciency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. This perspective is important
given that empirical studies provide contentious values for the deep parameters un-
derlying the household’s preferences7. In fact, potentially different sets of parameters,
and therefore different preferences of the household, could account for various degrees
of inertia.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we shall present the
model and the results. Section 3 will discuss and explain the results, comparing them
with those in the relevant literature. Section 4 will conclude.
2 The model
We develop our analysis in a basic New Keynesian framework where the CB deter-
mines the optimal monetary policy under discretion. We choose the discretion set up
because, besides being consistent with what usually maintained by policy-makers, it
leads to a less inertial policy response compared to the alternatives of i) commitment
and ii) commitment in a timeless perspective. Abstracting from the link between
commitment and interest rate smoothing allows a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between the preferences of the private sector and the optimal interest rate
inertia.
In the stylised economy we consider, agent j belongs to a continuum of unit mass
of identical households, each producing a different variety of a consumption good
6It is worth noting that the paper does neither dwell on the welfare properties of interest smoothing
as in Woodford (1999, 2003), nor on the predictability of interest rates, as in Rudebusch (2002, 2006).
7See for instance Okubo (2008a and 2008b) on the estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption.
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indexed by j. For the sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume
preferences only on consumption. These preferences are parametrised by the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, i.e. σ, and a measure of inertia in the household’s
preferences that we assume to be captured by the degree of habit persistence, i.e. κ.
Following Abel (1990), we write the household’s utility function as
Et
∞∑
τ=0
δτU
(
Ct+τ , Ct+τ
)
, U
(
Ct+τ , Ct+τ
)
=
(
Ct/C
κ
t−1
)1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
, σ, κ ∈ (0, 1) ,
where δ is the intertemporal discount factor, Ct is total consumption of consumer/producer
j, which is a composite good given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum
of varieties of the consumption good, Ct ≡
[∫
(Ct (j))
1− 1
ϑ dj
] 1
1−ϑ
. The parameter
ϑ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among any two differentiated varieties,
and Ct is total aggregate consumption.
In order to build a realistic transmission mechanism able to incorporate a one-
period lag in the transmission of monetary policy interventions to the real activity,
we assume one-period ahead predetermined consumption decisions. Thus, preferences
maximization subject to a budget constraint and a no-Ponzi condition leads to the
following log-linearised Euler equation
ct+1 = βct+(1− β) ct+2|t−(1− β)σ
(
it+1|t − pit+2|t
)
+ηt+1, β ≡ κ (1− σ)1 + κ (1− σ) , (1)
where ct is consumption, pit is inflation, it is the short term nominal interest rate, and
ηt is a demand shock. For any variable x, the expression xt+τ |t stands for the expected
value of that variable in period t+τ conditional on the information available in period
t; lower case variables denote log-deviations from their respective constant steady-
state values. As in Flamini (2007), equation (1) can be solved forward obtaining the
following equation
ct+1 = κ (1− σ) ct − σrt+1|t + ηt+1, rt ≡
∞∑
τ=0
(
it+τ |t − pit+τ+1|t
)
, (2)
which will be referred to in the discussion below.
As said, we assume that each agent j produces a differentiated variety using the
composite consumption good C. Letting Y p be the total quantity of consumption C
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used in the economy for production, the aggregate demand Yt can be written as
Yt = Ct + Y
p
t . (3)
Then, we also assume that variety j is produced according to
Yt (j) = f (Y
p
t ) , ∀j, (4)
where f is an increasing, concave, and isoelastic production function. Hence the
total quantity of good C used in production turns out to be related to the aggregate
demand by the relationship
Y pt = f
−1 (Yt) . (5)
Log-linearising (3) around the steady state values and using (5), one obtains
yt = ct (6)
where yt denotes the log-deviation of the aggregate demand from its steady-state8.
Thus, accounting for the Euler equation (2), the aggregate demand can be appropri-
ately rewritten as
yt+1 = κ (1− σ) yt − σrt+1|t + ηt+1. (7)
The supply side of the economy is summarised by the following New-Keynesian
Phillips curve, which is derived in the Appendix:
pit+2 =
1
1 + ζ
[
ζpit+1 + pit+3|t +
(1− α)2
α (1 + ωϑ)
ωyt+2|t
]
+ εt+2, (8)
where (1− α), using the Calvo (1983) staggered prices scheme, is the probability
that in any period the consumer/producer chooses an optimal price; ζ, following
Christiano et al. (2005), is the indexation to previous period inflation when it is not
possible to up-date optimally the price of a variety; ω is the output elasticity of the
marginal input requirement function; and ε is a zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock.
In order to have a realistic two-period lag in the transmission of monetary policy to
inflation, pricing decisions are assumed to be predetermined two periods in advance.
8See the Appendix for details.
6
We point out that predetermined decisions in consumption and production are
important to generate realistic transmission lags of the monetary policy to real activ-
ity and inflation. This feature of the model is in line with the conventional wisdom
at CBs.
The model is closed assuming that the CB finds a policy that maximizes its
preferences under the assumption of discretion and subject to the law of motion of
the economy given by the aggregate relations (7) and (8). The CB’s preferences are
represented as a quadratic loss function depending on the volatility of inflation and
output gap around their steady-state values, and on the volatility of the interest rates
changes. This loss function can be written as
Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
pi2t+τ + λy
2
t + ν (it − it−1)2
]
,
where λ and ν are the weights expressing, respectively, the preferences for the stabil-
isation of the output gap and for the smoothing of the interest rate path in terms of
those for the stabilisation of inflation.
At any period, the CB minimises its loss choosing a path for the short-term
nominal interest rate which turns out to be a linear function of the state variables.
In this economy, the equilibrium is a set of sequences,
{
it+τ |t, pit+τ |t, yt+τ |t,
}∞
τ=0
,
conditional to the structural parameters of the model9.
3 Household’s and CB preferences, and interest rate in-
ertia
Several works investigating the degree of interest rate inertia by means of empirical
versions of a reduced-form new Keynesian model reached the conclusion that the
aggregate demand plays a crucial role. In what follows we will make a step forward
and try to distinguish the relative importance of the agent’s preferences, while keeping
into account the restrictions imposed by the structure of the theoretical model on the
interaction of the deep parameters.
9To solve the optimization problem we use the algorithm developed by Oudiz and Sachs (1985)
as well as by Backus and Driffill (1986); a detailed description is provided by Soderlind (1999).
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Accordingly, our analysis will focus on how two basic parameters belonging to
the demand side, i.e the EIS (σ) and the persistence in the household’s behavior (κ),
affect the optimal degree of interest rate inertia, defined as the optimal unconditional
variability of interest rate changes and measured by the standard deviation of the
first difference of the interest rates, i.e. std (∆it).
In this exercise we shall start considering the impact on std (∆it) of changing one
parameter at the time while keeping the other fixed. Notably, we take into account
the limitations that fixing the values of some parameters imposes on the admissible
range of variability of those we change. Specifically, the ranges of values for κ and σ we
investigate are consistent with the empirical estimates on the reduced-form coefficient
in the aggregate demand equation. Figure 1, panel a presents the relationship between
σ, the preferences of the CB over smoothing the interest rate path (i.e. ν), and the
interest rate inertia std (∆it) , while panel b presents the relationship between the
κ, the preferences of the CB over smoothing the interest rate path (i.e. ν), and the
interest rate inertia std (∆it)10.
Panel a shows that both the EIS and the CB preferences for smoothing the interest
rate contribute to determine the size of the optimal std (∆it). It also reveals that,
in presence of not too large smoothing preferences, σ plays an important role in
determining the interest rate inertia. Furthermore, it indicates that the degree of
volatility in interest rates changes remains limited as long as the EIS is large enough.
Focusing on HPC, panel b reveals that κ is negatively related to the degree of interest
rate inertia. It also shows that when we reduce to the minimum the role played
by the CB preferences for smoothing the path of the interest rate, the amount of
optimal interest rate inertia varies a lot according to the persistence in the household’s
behavior.
Figures 1 (based on Table 1 reported in the Appendix) reveals that high CB
preferences for smoothing the interest rate, which could be due to the various ra-
10The structure of the current model is similar to Svensson (2000). Thus, we follow Svensson in
the choice of the structural parameters that are fixed, i.e. α = 0.5, ϑ = 1.25, ω = 0.8, ση = 1,
and σε = 1, and λ = 0.5. The remaining parameter is ζ which we set equal to 1 as in Boivin and
Giannoni (2006). In Figure 1, panel a, we also set κ = 0.5 and in panel b, σ = 0.2.
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Figure 1: The relationship between σ, κ, ν and std (∆it)
tionales discussed in the Introduction, tend to limit the role played by other factors
in determining the degree of interest rate inertia. It is thus interesting to observe
what happens to the interaction of σ, κ and std (∆it) when the relative importance
of the smoothing component in the CB loss function becomes negligible. Notably, we
do not argue to go as far as striking the concern for interest rate smoothing out of
the CB loss function. In fact, even if the rationales for smoothing were not actually
contemplated by the central bankers (so that they did not really have an important
smoothing preference per se), it would still be reasonable to postulate a small value
of ν in the loss: this guarantees that monetary policy does not become unrealistic,
that is characterised by huge and frequent reversals in the interest rate path. Ac-
cordingly, in what follows we shall consider a tiny, yet positive value of the smoothing
preferences.11
11The smallest value of ν we consider, i.e. 0.005, is 20 times smaller than that usually employed
to represent little CB preferences for the smoothing component (see Rudebusch 2002).
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3.1 The role of the transmission mechanism and the forward-lookingness
of the agents in determining optimal policy inertia
The findings discussed above depend on how σ and κ affect the transmission mech-
anism of the monetary policy when the CB wishes to stabilise the economy with a
realistic, i.e. not too aggressive, policy. To explain the mechanism through which σ
and κ affects std (∆it), it is useful to rewrite equation (2) as
ct+1 = −σrt+1|t − σ [κ (1− σ)] rt −
σ [κ (1− σ)]2
1− Lκ (1− σ)rt−1 + ηt+1, L ≡ Lag operator
(9)
Equation (9) splits consumption in three components. The first two embed the
most recent plans decided by the CB, i.e.
{
it+τ |t
}∞
τ=0
, that affect consumption in
period (t+ 1) ; we call these terms ”recent past policy”. The third term embeds the
plans decided in all the periods before and including (t− 1), and we call it ”remote
past policy”.
We now define the impact on ct+1 of each of the two components of the recent
past monetary policy relative to the remote past monetary policy as the ratios
Rrt+1|t =
1− Lκ (1− σ)
[κ (1− σ)]2 , R
rt =
1− Lκ (1− σ)
κ (1− σ) .
These ratios can be interpreted as measures of the relative efficiency of the most
recent policy actions. Clearly, the lower Rrt+1|t and Rrt , the less efficient is the
transmission mechanism of the recent policies with respect to the old ones. Since
these ratios are positively and negatively related to σ and κ, the lower σ and/or
the larger κ, the smaller is the impact that the CB can exert on the decisions of
the household in any period12. Thus, when the EIS is small, the CB needs to move
aggressively the interest rate to affect the household’s decisions. Similarly, the larger
the HPC, the more the past matters for the household, and the more difficult it is
for the CB to offset unforeseen shocks by means of small interest rate changes.
A relation between persistence in consumption and interest rate smoothing is
also found by Corrado and Holly (2004). Interestingly, in their work this relationship
12The first derivative of Rrt+1|t and Rrt with respect to σ and κ are R
rt+1|t
σ > 0, R
rt+1|t
κ < 0 and
Rrtσ > 0, R
rt
κ < 0.
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Figure 2: The relationship between σ, κ, Rrt+1|t , Rrt and std (∆it)
is generated by the maximisation of the household welfare, which is decreasing in
interest rate changes due to the presence of multiplicative habits in consumption.
In our work, instead, this relationship is generated by the negative impact of habits
on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. It is therefore
independent of the household’s welfare.
Our result is also in line with the empirical findings of Castelnuovo (2006), who
relates the interest rate smoothness to the agents’ degree of forward-lookingness.
The current analysis, however, makes two steps forward by i) explaining the relation
between the agents’ degree of forward-lookingness, which is inversely related to κ and
the policy inertia, and ii) showing that this is modulated by σ. Figure 2 (based on
Table 2 reported in the Appendix) illustrates the relationship between σ, κ, Rrt+1|t ,
Rrt and std (∆it).
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Figure 3: The relationship between σ, κ and ρ
Summing up, these results suggest that household’s preferences can have a rele-
vant impact on optimal interest rate inertia besides the influence of the interest rate
smoothing concern on the part of the CB.
This mechanism is also reflected in the optimal coefficients of the reaction func-
tion, among which that for the lagged interest rate, i.e. ρ. Indeed, ρ is the tool
that allows the policy-makers to adjust the aggressiveness of the monetary policy
according to the efficiency of the transmission mechanism. Figure 3 (based on Table
3 reported in the Appendix) shows, for instance, the impact of σ and κ on ρ.
As can be seen, when σ increases, the optimal ρ tends to decrease: since the
transmission mechanism becomes more efficient in transmitting the most recent policy
so that the bank needs not to implement large changes in the interest rate, a higher
interest rate inertia (i.e. a smaller std (∆it)) is achieved with an optimal reaction
function in which the previous interest rate enters with a smaller weight.
We note that κ has a minor impact on ρ. Clearly, this finding is not at odds
with the important impact of κ on the optimal degree of policy inertia (std (∆it))
discussed above. Rather, it reveals that the high degree of policy inertia due to large
values of κ does not necessarily mirrors in a large ρ. Indeed, at any change in the
structure of the economy, all other coefficients of the reaction function can change
together with ρ. This suggests that some caution is necessary in interpreting the
results of those studies on the interest rate smoothing that look exclusively at ρ.
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Our results shed some light on the role played by the degree of forward-lookingness
of the agents with respect to interest rate inertia. We find that the degree of inertia in
consumption contributes to a limited extent to the determination of ρ, and yet it does
affect the degree of inertia in monetary policy. It could be argued that this conclusion
is partially at odds with some findings in Rudebusch (2002), who claims that the
degree of forward-lookingness of the agents matters a lot for ρ. The difference in the
results depends on two main factors. First, as said above, our analysis only focuses on
the extent of variation of the deep parameters that is consistent with the constraints
imposed by the micro-founded structure of our model. Second, while Rudebusch
attributes the degree of forward-lookingness of the AD in the reduced-form model to
the degree of forward-lookingness of the agents, the former may depend, as we show
here, on both the latter and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
4 Concluding remarks and policy implications
This paper investigates the relation between the household’s and CB preferences and
the optimal interest rate inertia. Using a theoretical new Keynesian model, allows us
to draw a few interesting results which contribute to the literature on interest rate
inertia.
First, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and the degree of
persistence in the household’s behavior play an important role in determining the level
of optimal monetary policy inertia. In particular, when the CBs do not have a special
reason to smooth the interest rate beyond avoiding a roller coast policy, economies
featuring different household’s preferences can exhibit important differences in the
degree of interest rate inertia.
Second, this contribution shows that interest rate inertia does not necessarily
depend on high CB preferences for smoothing the path of the interest rate. In fact,
it can also be associated to either a large elasticity of substitution, or a high degree
of forward-lookingness in the household’s behavior, or both.
As we argue, these results are grounded on the impact of the household’s pref-
erences on the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy. When the elasticity
13
of substitution is small and/or the degree of forward-lookingness of the household is
low, the impact of the most recent monetary policy on the household’s decisions is
low relative to the impact of past policies. Thus, the CB needs a more aggressive
policy to buffer unforeseen shocks. As a consequence, the volatility of interest rate
changes increases.
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5 Appendix
Details on the derivation of the aggregate demand
To derive equation (6) first log-linearize (3) around steady state values
(
Y ,C, Y p
)
to obtain
yt = φct + (1− φ) ypt , φ ≡
C
Y
.
Then, using (5) and recalling that the function f is isoelastic, leads to
yt = φct + (1− φ) ξyt,
where the ξ is the output elasticity of the input requirement function (5). From which
we obtain
yt =
φ
1− (1− φ) ξ ct.
Finally, we assume that a percentage increase of the quantity produced requires the
same percentage increase of the input13, that is ξ = 1, and we obtain
yt = ct.
Derivation of the aggregate supply
This derivation of the aggregate supply follows Flamini (2007). Considering (4),
for each firm j, the input requirement function is Y pt = f
−1 (Yt (j)) so that the
13This is a reasonable assumption in the short run model used here.
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variable cost of producing the quantity Yt (j) is Ptf−1 [Yt (j)]. Since there is a Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregate of consumption goods, the demand for each variety j is Yt (j) =
Yt
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ϑ
, where Pt (j) is the nominal price for variety j. Then, assuming that
pricing decisions are made 2 periods in advance, firm j profit maximization problem
is
max
P˜t+2
Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ λ˜t+τ+2
 P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1Pt+2+τ Yt+τ+2
[
P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1
Pt+2+τ
]−ϑ
−V
Yt+τ+2( P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1
Pt+2+τ
)−ϑ ,
where Ψt+τ+1 ≡
(
Pt+τ+1
Pt+1
)ζ
, V ≡ f−1, and λ˜t, P˜t+2 denote the marginal utility of
consumption, and the new price chosen in period t for period t+ 2, respectively. The
first-order condition is
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ λ˜t+τ+2
[
P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1
Pt+2+τ
−φV ′
Yt+τ+2( P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1
Pt+2+τ
)−ϑYt+τ+2( P˜t+2Ψt+τ+1
Pt+2+τ
)−ϑ = 0
where φ ≡ − ϑ1−ϑ , which can be rewritten as
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ λ˜t+τ+2
[
Xt+2
∏τ
s=1 Π
ζ
t+1+s∏τ
s=1 Πt+2+s
(10)
−φV ′
Yt+τ+2(Xt+2∏τs=1 Πζt+1+s∏τ
s=1 Πt+2+s
)−ϑYt+τ+2(Xt+2∏τs=1 Πζt+1+s∏τ
s=1 Πt+2+s
)−ϑ = 0
where Xt+2 ≡ P˜t+2Pt+2 and Πt+2 ≡
Pt+2
Pt+1
.
In equilibrium any firm that is free to choose the price in period t will choose the
same price, P˜t, and the remaining firms that are not free to choose the price in period
t will keep the previous period price updated to the previous period inflation. Thus,
the aggregate price is given by
Pt =
α(Pt−1(Pt−1
Pt−2
)ζ)1−ϑ
+ (1− α) P˜ (1−ϑ)t
 11−ϑ
⇐⇒ Πt =
[
1− (1− α)X(1−ϑ)t
]− 1
1−ϑ
α
1
1−ϑΠζt−1.
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Then we log-linearize the first order condition around the steady state. Let us
allow bounded fluctuations in
(
λ˜t, Xt, Πt, Yt
)
around the steady state
(
λ˜, 1, 1, Y,
)
and let small letters be log-deviations from their steady state value. Then we obtain
v
′
= ωy (j) ,
pit = ζpit−1 +
1− α
α
xt, (11)
where ω > 0 is the elasticity of V
′
with respect to yt (j) . Then, log-linearizing (10)
yields
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ
[
xt+2 −
τ∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+1+s)
−ω
(
yt+τ+2 − ϑ
(
xt+2 −
τ∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+1+s)
))]}
= 0
which can be rewritten as
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ
[
(1 + ωϑ)
(
xt+2 −
τ∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+1+s)
)
− ωyt+τ+2
]}
= 0 (12)
Now note that
∞∑
τ=0
ατδτ
τ∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+2+s−1) =
∞∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+1+s)
∞∑
τ=s
ατδτ
=
∞∑
s=1
(pit+2+s − ζpit+1+s) α
sδs
1− αδ
=
1
1− αδ
∞∑
τ=1
ατδτ (pit+2+τ − ζpit+1+τ ) .
Then, equation (12) can be rewritten as
Et
{
1 + ωϑ
1− αδ xt+2 −
1 + ωϑ
1− αδ
∞∑
τ=1
ατδτ (pit+2+τ − ζpit+2+τ−1)−
∞∑
τ=0
ατδτyt+τ+2
}
= 0
⇐⇒
Etxt+2 = Et
{ ∞∑
τ=1
ατδτ (pit+2+τ − ζpit+2+τ−1) + 1− αδ
1 + ωϑ
∞∑
τ=0
ατδτωyt+τ+2
}
= Et
{
αδ (pit+2+1 − ζpit+2) + 1− αδ
1 + ωϑ
ωyt+2
}
+ αδEtxt+2+1
16
Next, combining the previous equation with (11) we obtain
α
1− αEt (pit+2 − ζpit+1) = Et
{
αδ (pit+2+1 − ζpit+2) + 1− αδ
1 + ωϑ
ωyt+2
}
+αδ
α
1− αEt (pit+2+1 − ζpit+2) .
Finally, approximating δ by unit in order to ensure the Natural-rate hypothesis, rear-
ranging, and adding the cost-push shock εt+2 and ζ1+δζ εt+1 to the previous equation
we obtain
pit+2 =
ζ
(1 + ζ)
pit+1 +
1
(1 + ζ)
pit+3|t +
1
(1 + ζ)
(1− α) (1− α)
α (1 + ωϑ)
ωyt+2|t + εt+2
Solution of the model
The CB problem consisting in maximizing the CB preferences subject to the
aggregate demand and supply is solved using the algorithm developed by Oudiz and
Sachs (1985) as well as by Backus and Driffill (1986); a detailed description of this
numerical method is provided by Soderlind (1999).
References
[1] Abel, Andrew B. (1990), “Asset prices under habit formation and catching
up with the Joneses”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
80(2),38–42
[2] Alcidi, Cinzia, Alessandro Flamini and Andrea Fracasso. (2009) “Pol-
icy regime switches, Judgement and Taylor rules in the Greenspan
Era”Economica, forthcoming
[3] Amato, Jeffery D. and Thomas Laubach. (1999) “The Value of Interest-rate
Smoothing: How the Private Sector Helps the Federal Reserve.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 84, 47-64
[4] Aoki, Kosuke. (2003) “On the Optimal Monetary Policy Response to Noisy
Indicators.”Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 501–523
[5] Backus, D., Driffill, J., 1986. The consistency of optimal policy in stochastic
rational expectations models. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 124.
17
[6] Boivin, Jean and Marc P. Giannoni (2006) ”Has Monetary Policy Become
More Effective?” The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2006,
88(3): 445–462.
[7] Calvo, Guillermo. (1983) “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing frame-
work”, Journal of Monetary Economics,12(3),383–398
[8] Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy. (1996) “Monetary Policy as a Search
Process.” American Economic Review, 86(4), 689–702.
[9] Carare, Alina and Robert Tchaidze. (2005) “The Use and Abuse of Taylor
Rules: How Precisely Can We Estimate Them?”, IMF Working Papers
05/148, International Monetary Fund.
[10] Castelnuovo, Efrem. (2003) “Taylor Rule, Omitted Variables, and Interest
Rate smoothing in US.” Economic Letters 81, 55–59.
[11] Castelnuovo, Efrem. (2006), “The Fed’s Preference for Policy Rate Smooth-
ing: Overestimation Due to Misspecification?,” Topics in Macroeconomics,
BEP, 6(2), 1416–1416
[12] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans.
(2005), “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Mone-
tary Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, 113(1),1–45, February
[13] Consolo, Agostino and Carlo Favero. (2009), ”Monetary Policy inertia:
More a fiction than a fact?”, forthcoming in the Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics.
[14] Corrado, Luisa and Sean Holly (2004) “Habit formation and Interest-Rate
Smoothing”, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 215, Society for
Computational Economics
[15] Driffill, John and Zeno Rotondi. (2007), “Inertia in Taylor Rules”, CEPR
Discussion Papers 6570
18
[16] Flamini, Alessandro. (2007) “Inflation targeting and exchange rate pass-
through”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 26(7), 1113–1150,
November
[17] Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, (2004) “Interest-Rate Smoothing: Monetary Policy
Inertia or Unobserved Variables?” Contributions to Macroeconomics 4, Art.
3
[18] Goodfriend, Marvin. (1987) “Interest-Rate Smoothing and Price Level
Trend Stationarity.” Journal of Monetary Economics 19, 335-348.
[19] Goodhart, Charles. (1999) “Central Bankers and Uncertainty.” Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, February 102-114.
[20] Lansing, Kevin J. (2002) “Real-time estimation of trend output and the
illusion of interest rate smoothing,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review, 17–34.
[21] Levin, Andrew, Volker Wieland and John Williams. (1999) “The Ro-
bustness of Simple Monetary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty.” In
Monetary Policy Rules, edited by J. B. Taylor. Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
[22] Oudiz, G., Sachs, J., 1985. International policy coordination in dynamic
macroeconomic models. In: Buiter, W.H., Marston, R.C. (Eds.), Interna-
tional Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
[23] Okubo, Masakatsu. (2008a). “Intertemporal substitution and nonhomoth-
etic preferences”, Economics Letters, 98(1), 41–47, January
[24] Okubo, Masakatsu. (2008b), “On the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitu-
tion under Nonhomothetic Utility”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Bank-
ing, 40(5), 1065–72, August.
19
[25] Orphanides, Athanasios. (1998) “Monetary Policy Evaluation with Noisy
Information.” Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion
Series Paper 50.
[26] Rudebusch, Glenn D. (2001) “Is the Fed too Timid? Monetary Policy in
an Uncertain World.” Review of Economics and Statistics 83, 203–217.
[27] Rudebusch, Glenn D. (2002) “Term Structure Evidence on Interest-Rate
Smoothing and Monetary Policy Inertia.” Journal of Monetary Economics
49, 1161–1187.
[28] Rudebusch, Glenn D. (2006) “Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fic-
tion?”,International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(4), December.
[29] Sack, Brian P. and Volker Wieland. (2000) “Interest-Rate Smoothing and
Optimal Monetary Policy: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence”, Jour-
nal of Economics and Business 52, 205-228.
[30] Soderlind, Paul. (1999) ”Solution and estimation of RE macromodels with
optimal policy”, European Economic Review, 43 (4-6), 813–823.
[31] So¨derstro¨m, Ulf, Paul So¨derlind and Anders Vredin. (2005) “New-
Keynesian Models and Monetary Policy: A Re-examination of the Stylized
Facts”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 107(3), 521–546.
[32] Woodford, Michael. (1999) “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia,” Manchester
School, 67(0), 1–35.
[33] Woodford, Michael. (2003) “Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing”,Review of
Economic Studies 70, 861–886.
20
